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1 INTRODUCTION
A new computational method is presented to implement the system of deductive logic described by Aristotle in Prior
Analytics [1]. Each Aristotelian problem is interpreted as a parametric probability network in which the premises
give constraints on probabilities relating the problem’s categorical terms (major, minor, and middle). Each probability
expression from this network is evaluated to yield a linear function of the parameters in the probability model. By
this approach the constraints specified as premises translate into linear equalities and inequalities involving a few
real-valued variables. The problem’s figure (schema) describes which specific probabilities are constrained, relative
to those that are queried. Using linear optimization methods, the minimum and maximum feasible values of certain
queried probabilities are computed, subject to the constraints given as premises. These computed solutions determine
precisely which conclusions are necessary consequences of the premises. In this way, Aristotle’s logical deductions
can be accomplished by means of numerical computation.
This work is a synthesis of several existing methods, with the addition of a few new ideas. The most relevant
prior work is that of Boole, who presented several innovations in his 1854 treatise on the Laws of Thought [4]. Boole
demonstrated that logical propositions can be represented as algebraic formulas; more specifically, that statements
of what we now call propositional calculus can be expressed as polynomials with real-number coefficients. Boole
showed how to compute interesting results about logical propositions by solving systems of polynomial equations.
Boole also showed useful relationships between statements of logic and statements of probability. In the late 20th
century Pearl and others developed techniques for graphical probability models (Bayesian networks) which offer
several benefits regarding representation and inference [20, 9]. Several investigators have described methods for
symbolic inference in probability networks; these methods can be used to calculate polynomial formulas for queried
probability expressions [7, 5, 14, 22]. Boole already formulated optimization problems with polynomial objectives and
constraints derived from probability expressions; he solved his problems by ad hoc algebraic manipulations [4]. Today
there are general methods for solving linear and nonlinear polynomial optimization problems. For the linear case,
efficient computational methods were developed in the middle of the 20th century [6, 12]. It remains a challenge to
compute exact global solutions to unrestricted nonlinear polynomial optimization problems; there are many promising
methods which use various kinds of approximation [3, 21, 13, 17].
Two new ideas are presented here which complement these existing methods. First, a taxonomy of Aristotelian
categorical statements is developed, with a distinction drawn between ‘primary’ and ‘composite’ relations. In this
taxonomy, primary relations are mutually exclusive, whereas composite relations may overlap. For both kinds of rela-
tions the case of an impossible subject (antecedent) is handled explicitly. This taxonomy results in several more types
of categorical statements than are usually considered (we end up with seven). One benefit is that existential fallacies
are prevented. Second, the concept of ‘complementary’ syllogism is introduced, to contrast with ‘classical’ syllogism.
In a complementary syllogism the subject of the deduced categorical statement is held to be false instead of true.
Complementary syllogisms let us extract additional information from categorical premises that would otherwise be
lost to analysis. These new ideas (primary versus composite categorical relations; classical versus complementary syl-
logism) are combined with the existing methods mentioned above (Boole’s mathematical logic; probability networks
and symbolic probability inference; linear optimization) to provide the method of analysis presented here. Let us call
this synthesis the ‘probability-optimization paradigm’ for framing Aristotle’s logic.
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1.1 The Structure of Aristotle’s Logical Problems
The problems in Aristotle’s Prior Analytics involve three categorical terms, called ‘major’, ‘middle’, and ‘minor’,
each of which can be either true or false. Let us use A for the major term, B for the middle term, and C for the minor
term. We abbreviate truth as T and falsity as F. The major and minor terms are also called the ‘extreme’ terms, in
contrast to the middle. Each Aristotelian problem consists of two premises and a query. Each premise has a subject
and a predicate, each of which is one of the three categorical terms. Each premise also has a type that quantifies
the relationship between its subject and predicate terms. As described in detail in Section 2, we shall recognize
five main types of relationships: UNIVERSAL-AFFIRMATIVE, UNIVERSAL-NEGATIVE, PARTICULAR-AFFIRMATIVE,
PARTICULAR-NEGATIVE, and PARTICULAR-INTERMEDIATE. The UNIVERSAL relationships are further subdivided
into MATERIAL and EXISTENTIAL subtypes; this expands our repertoire of categorical relationships to seven types.
These seven relations, which are not mutually exclusive, are composites built from four primary relations which are
mutually exclusive; details appear in Section 2.2.
Aristotle imposed a few restrictions on how the various categorical terms may be used in a problem’s premises and
query. Both of the problem’s premises must use its middle term B. One premise must use the problem’s major term
A, and the other premise must use the problem’s minor term C (hence these premises are called ‘major’ and ‘minor’
themselves). Within each premise either term may occupy the position of subject or of predicate. These restrictions
allow four possible figures for Aristotelian problems, as shown in Table 1 and discussed further in Section 1.2. Regard-
less of which figure is used in a problem, the main query is always the same: to find out what relationship between the
major and minor terms is required by the given premises. In this query the major term A is used as predicate and the
minor term C used as subject; this choice of positions is precisely what distinguishes major from minor. The inferred
solution is a subset of the seven types of categorical relationships introduced above. We shall say that a ‘syllogism’
(deduction) has occurred when at least one of these types of relationships must hold. On the other hand there is no
syllogism when the premises do not require any particular relationship between the major and minor terms.
Note that mathematical relationships may be asserted as constraints or derived as solutions; these are two different
roles. For example, it is one thing to assert the relation x = 2 as a constraint that should be satisfied, and a different
thing to derive the relation x = 2 as a solution to some other system of constraints (for example, as one of the two
real solutions to the equation x2 = 4). Note also that constraints are not commandments; the constraint x = 2 does
not guarantee the solution x = 2, for the complete system of equations could be inconsistent with no solutions at all.
Anyway, we shall view Aristotle’s logical problems as systems of equations, both philosophically and practically.
Philosophically, we shall regard categorical statements like ‘A belongs to some B’ as relations like x = 2 or y > 0, to be
used in either of the two roles just mentioned: sometimes asserted as constraints, and sometimes derived as solutions
to other constraints. Practically, we shall translate logical statements about true/false terms into algebraic equalities
and inequalities involving real-valued variables (through the intermediate device of a probability model), and then use
standard algebraic and numerical methods to compute solutions to the original logical problems.
1.2 Notation for Problems in Four Figures
We now consider textual and graphical notation for Aristotle’s logical problems. Table 1 describes the four figures of
Aristotelian problems in symbolic and graphical notation. The symbolic notation indicates which term is the predicate
and which is the subject of each categorical statement (the two statements asserted as premises, and the one statement
used as a query). Capital italic letters A, B, and C stand for the major, middle, and minor terms. Small italic letters (with
optional accent marks) from the set {a, a´,e, e´, i,o,u} stand for types of categorical relationships, which are defined by
constraints on probabilities as shown in Table 4. For example a stands for the UNIVERSAL-AFFIRMATIVE-MATERIAL
relation and u stands for the PARTICULAR-INTERMEDIATE relation. Gothic letters m, n, and s stand for categorical
relations from the set {a, a´,e, e´, i,o,u}: m for the relation type of the major premise, n for the relation type of the minor
premise, and s for the relation type of the queried statement. For example, a problem in the second figure has a major
premise BmA with predicate B, subject A, and relation type m; it has a minor premise BnC with predicate B, subject C,
and relation type n; and it has query AsC with predicate A, subject C, and relation type s. The example problem from
Section 3.1 follows the second figure. Its major premise BeA uses the UNIVERSAL-NEGATIVE-MATERIAL relation
(denoted e) as m, and the minor premise BiC uses the PARTICULAR-AFFIRMATIVE relation (denoted i) as n. The
meaning of the query AsC is discussed in Section 3.2.
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Table 1 Four figures of Aristotelian problems, using major term A, middle term B, and minor term C. The major
premise has type m, the minor premise has type n, and the goal is to find the implied types s for the query statement
AsC. The possible relation types are defined in Table 4. In the diagrams each arrow points from the subject to the
predicate of a conditional statement; solid arrows indicate premises and dotted arrows indicate queries.
It is interesting that Aristotle already described his figures in graphical language, indicating the positions of the
various categorical terms on the page. For example, regarding his second figure, Aristotle wrote:
. . . by middle term in it I mean that which is predicated by both subjects, by extremes the terms of which
this is said, by major extreme that which lies near the middle, by minor that which is further away from
the middle. The middle term stands outside the extremes, and is first in position. ([1] 26b35)
Furthermore, Aristotle described his third figure in this way:
. . . by extremes I mean the predicates, by the major extreme that which is further from the middle, by
the minor that which is nearer to it. The middle term stands outside the extremes, and is last in position.
([1] 28a15)
The graphical diagrams included in Table 1 realize Aristotle’s original textual descriptions in one view (the ‘flat’ dia-
grams), and use a different graph layout in an alternative view (the ‘triangular’ diagrams). As has become customary,
a fourth figure has been added. The fourth figure is related to the first by having the major and minor terms swapped
with one another.
1.3 A Basic Probability Model
Our basic probability model represents the joint probabilities of the three categorical terms A, B, and C. With two
possible truth values for each of the three terms, there are 23 or 8 possible combinations of truth values. To each
combination i of truth values we assign a symbolic parameter xi that represents its probability. These parameters and
their associated combinations of truth values are shown in Table 2 as the input probability table Pr0 (A,B,C). To respect
the laws of probability, these parameters x1, . . . ,x8 are constrained by 06 xi 6 1 and ∑i xi = 1. Parametric probability
networks such as this basic model are used like databases to answer queries. Each query requests an unconditioned
probability or a conditional probability. Each response is a polynomial or a quotient of polynomials in the model’s
parameters. For example, starting from the inputs shown in Table 2, the respective probabilities that B is true, that B
and A are both true, that B is true and A is false, and that A is true given that B is true are computed as the following
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A B C Pr0 (A,B,C)
T T T x1
T T F x2
T F T x3
T F F x4
F T T x5
F T F x6
F F T x7
F F F x8
Table 2 The input probability table Pr0 (A,B,C) for the basic model, with real-valued parameters x1 through x8 subject
to the constraints 06 xi 6 1 and ∑i xi = 1.
(a)
A B Pr (A,B)
T T x1 + x2
T F x3 + x4
F T x5 + x6
F F x7 + x8
(b)
B C Pr (B,C)
T T x1 + x5
T F x2 + x6
F T x3 + x7
F F x4 + x8
(c)
C A Pr (C,A)
T T x1 + x3
T F x5 + x7
F T x2 + x4
F F x6 + x8
(d)
A Pr (A)
T x1 + x2 + x3 + x4
F x5 + x6 + x7 + x8
(e)
B Pr (B)
T x1 + x2 + x5 + x6
F x3 + x4 + x7 + x8
(f)
C Pr (C)
T x1 + x3 + x5 + x7
F x2 + x4 + x6 + x8
Table 3 A few output probability tables computed from the inputs in Table 2.
algebraic expressions:
Pr (B) ⇒ x1 + x2 + x5 + x6 (1)
Pr (B,A) ⇒ x1 + x2 (2)
Pr
(
B,A
)
⇒ x5 + x6 (3)
Pr (A |B) ⇒ (x1 + x2)/(x1 + x2 + x5 + x6) (4)
As you can see, each of these calculated values is either the sum of several input probabilities from Table 2 or the
quotient of two such sums. Table 3 shows several output probabilities computed from the inputs in Table 2. These
outputs will be useful for the analysis that follows. It happens with this basic probability model that all computed
probabilities are linear functions of the xi parameters (or quotients of such linear functions). Other probability models
can yield nonlinear polynomials and quotients (when the full-joint probability has been factored into multiple input
tables).
The essential methods of symbolic probability inference were described well enough several centuries ago [15].
There have since been developed more rigorous mathematical formulations, more efficient inference algorithms, and
powerful graphical models [10, 8, 9]. The author has developed some computational methods for parametric proba-
bility networks as well [16, 18]; these methods include some idiosyncratic notation that is reviewed presently. Input
and output probabilities are distinguished from one another. Input probabilities, used to specify the probability model,
are written with the subscript 0, as in Pr0 (A,B,C). Output probabilities, computed from the inputs, are written with
no subscript, as in Pr (B). The double right arrow ⇒ is used to indicate computation, such as the evaluation of a sym-
bolic probability expression or the simplification of an arithmetical formula. This meaning is distinct from the test or
assertion of equality denoted with the usual equal sign =. Finally, probability tables and their elements share similar
notation. A probability expression such as Pr (A,B) may refer to a table containing several values, such as the four
elements shown as Table 3 (a). But we can also use for example A to abbreviate the event A=T and A to abbreviate the
event A = F, and hence use Pr (A,B) to mean the individual element Pr (A = T,B = T). The default used here is that
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probability expressions refer to individual elements; it will be announced in the neighboring text when a probability
expression refers instead to an entire table containing several elements.
2 FROM CATEGORICAL STATEMENTS TO LINEAR EQUALITIES AND INEQUALITIES
2.1 Naive Types of Categorical Relationships
Let us now translate Aristotelian categorical statements into linear equalities and inequalities involving the parameters
of the basic probability model from Section 1.3. To begin, we regard a categorical statement with predicate P and
subject Q as a relation involving Pr (P |Q), the conditional probability that P is true given that Q is true. Here P and Q
can be any of the three categorical terms A, B, or C. At first glance, Aristotle’s Prior Analytics describes four types of
relations between categorical terms, which correspond the listed conditional-probability statements:
UNIVERSAL-AFFIRMATIVE ‘P belongs to all Q’ Pr (P |Q) = 1
UNIVERSAL-NEGATIVE ‘P belongs to no Q’ Pr (P |Q) = 0
PARTICULAR-AFFIRMATIVE ‘P belongs to some Q’ Pr (P |Q)> 0
PARTICULAR-NEGATIVE ‘P does not belong to some Q’ Pr (P |Q)< 1
(5)
Recall that conditional probabilities are defined as quotients of unconditioned probabilities:
Pr (P |Q) ≡ Pr (P,Q)
Pr (Q) (6)
There are two troublesome issues with the four types of relations listed above. The first issue is that there is no
prescription for how to handle the case that Pr (Q) = 0 (meaning that it is impossible a priori for the subject term Q to
be true). Since the laws of probability require that Pr (P,Q) = 0 when Pr (Q) = 0, this exceptional case would force the
quotient shown in Equation 6 to have the indefinite value 0/0. It is ambiguous whether equations such as 0/0 = 0 and
0/0 = 1 should be considered satisfied (on the one hand, both rearranged equations 0 = 0 ·0 and 0 = 0 ·1 are true; on
the other hand, neither 0 nor 1 provides a unique solution to the rearranged equation 0 = 0 ·c). The second issue is that
the listed relations are not mutually exclusive. For example Pr (P |Q) = 1 requires also Pr (P |Q)> 0, and conversely
Pr (P |Q)> 0 leaves it possible but not certain that Pr (P |Q) = 1. This lack of exclusivity may lead to confusion about
precisely which relations hold true in any given circumstance.
As an aside, note some potential confusion regarding the negation of a PARTICULAR-AFFIRMATIVE premise.
The English phrase ‘P does not belong to some Q’ leaves ambiguity about what is negated. This phrase could be
interpreted to mean, ‘It is not the case that P belongs to some Q’—suggesting the conditional-probability constraint
Pr (P |Q) = 0. Or this phrase could be interpreted to mean, ‘The negation of P belongs to some Q’—suggesting the
constraint Pr
(
P |Q) > 0 (or its equivalent Pr (P |Q) < 1 which is listed above). We shall assume the latter of these
interpretations.
2.2 Primary and Composite Relations
In order to address the troublesome issues with the naive categorical relations presented above, let us develop a different
initial set of relation types—making direct use of the numerator Pr (P,Q) and denominator Pr (Q) from Equation 6
instead of their quotient Pr (P |Q). Let us identify these four primary relations concerning a predicate term P and a
subject term Q:
R1. IMPOSSIBLE-SUBJECT ‘There are no Q’
R2. UNIVERSAL-NEGATIVE-EXISTENTIAL ‘P belongs to no Q, and there are some Q’
R3. PARTICULAR-INTERMEDIATE ‘P belongs to some but not all Q’
R4. UNIVERSAL-AFFIRMATIVE-EXISTENTIAL ‘P belongs to all Q, and there are some Q’
(7)
We shall define these primary relations using constraints on two probabilities from the model in Section 1.3: the
probability Pr (Q) that the subject term Q is true, and the probability Pr (P,Q) that both the predicate term P and
the subject term Q are true. We consider the two cases Pr (Q) = 0 and Pr (Q) > 0 on one axis, and the three cases
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Primary Relations
Composite Relation Code R1 R2 R3 R4 Probability Constraint
Universal-affirmative-material PaQ • • Pr (P,Q) = Pr (Q)
Universal-affirmative-existential Pa´Q • Pr (P,Q) = Pr (Q) and Pr (Q)> 0
Universal-negative-material PeQ • • Pr (P,Q) = 0
Universal-negative-existential Pe´Q • Pr (P,Q) = 0 and Pr (Q)> 0
Particular-affirmative PiQ • • Pr (P,Q)> 0
Particular-negative PoQ • • Pr (P,Q)< Pr (Q)
Particular-intermediate PuQ • Pr (P,Q)> 0 and Pr (P,Q)< Pr (Q)
Table 4 Composite relations between a categorical predicate P and a subject Q, using disjunctions of the primary
relations R1, R2, R3, and R4 from Equation 8. Each bullet • indicates that the given primary relation is included in the
given composite: for example universal-affirmative-material (code a) holds if either primary relation R1 or R4
holds. The integrated probability constraint that defines each composite categorical relation is shown.
Pr (P,Q) = 0, 0< Pr (P,Q)< Pr (Q), and Pr (P,Q)= Pr (Q) on the other. This gives the following matrix of constraints,
whose entries define the primary relations described in Equation 7:
Pr (P,Q) = 0 0 < Pr (P,Q)< Pr (Q) Pr (P,Q) = Pr (Q)
Pr (Q) = 0 R1 R1
Pr (Q)> 0 R2 R3 R4
(8)
For example R1 is defined as the case that Pr (Q) = 0; and R2 is defined as the case that Pr (Q)> 0 and Pr (P,Q) = 0.
Note that when Pr (Q) = 0 the laws of probability require Pr (P,Q) = 0 also. Hence in the case R1 both constraints
Pr (P,Q) = 0 and Pr (P,Q) = Pr (Q) are satisfied. Furthermore, when Pr (Q) = 0 it is not possible for Pr (P,Q) to be
strictly greater nor strictly less than zero; hence the corresponding entry of the matrix in Equation 8 is empty. The
constraints of Equation 8 imply derived constraints on the conditional probability Pr (P |Q): R1 requires that Pr (P |Q)
must have the indefinite value 0/0; R2 requires that Pr (P |Q) must equal 0; R4 requires that Pr (P |Q) must equal 1;
and R3 requires that Pr (P |Q) must be strictly greater than 0 and strictly less than 1.
The primary relations R1, R2, R3, and R4 given by Equations 7 and 8 address both issues identified in Section 2.1:
the defining constraints are mutually exclusive and they include the case Pr (Q) = 0 explicitly. We can now proceed
to use various subsets of these four primary relations to define composite relations which include the seven types of
categorical relationships promised in the introduction. These compositions are logical disjunctions. For example, the
combination ‘R1 or R4’ yields the composite relation that either Pr (Q) = 0, or Pr (Q) > 0 and Pr (P,Q) = Pr (Q):
in other words, the combined statement that ‘Either there are no Q, or there are some Q and P belongs to all of
them’. This composite relation can be specified as the integrated constraint Pr (P,Q) = Pr (Q). Recalling Equation 6,
it follows from this integrated constraint that the conditional probability Pr (P |Q) must have either the definite value
1 or the indefinite value 0/0 (depending on whether Pr (Q) > 0 or Pr (Q) = 0). In a sense this composite relation
parallels the statement of material implication Q→ P from the propositional calculus; thus we call it the UNIVERSAL-
AFFIRMATIVE-MATERIAL relation.
Table 4 shows seven composite relations defined as disjunctive combinations of the primary relations introduced
above. This set of composite relations is meant to be expressive rather than exhaustive; in total there are 24 or
16 possible sets of 4 primary relations. Table 5 gives conditional-probability and natural-language descriptions of the
seven selected composite relations. In both tables, the composite relations are assigned codes to abbreviate them, based
on the letters introduced in medieval times to designate different types of Aristotelian premises. The traditional codes
a, e, i, and o are supplemented with accented characters a´ and e´ that distinguish EXISTENTIAL subtypes of UNIVERSAL
statements from their MATERIAL counterparts. Also, the letter u has been added to designate the PARTICULAR relation
meaning ‘some but not all’. Within this document, for abbreviations PaQ, PiQ, and so on, the predicate P is displayed
before the relation code, and the subject Q after it. Be aware that some authors use the opposite convention. Aristotle’s
original texts did not use such abbreviations at all.
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Composite Relation Code Derived Cond. Prob. Natural-Language Description
Universal-affirmative-material PaQ Pr (P |Q) = 1 or 0/0 P belongs to all Q, or there are no Q
Universal-affirmative-existential Pa´Q Pr (P |Q) = 1 P belongs to all Q, and there are some Q
Universal-negative-material PeQ Pr (P |Q) = 0 or 0/0 P belongs to no Q, or there are no Q
Universal-negative-existential Pe´Q Pr (P |Q) = 0 P belongs to no Q, and there are some Q
Particular-affirmative PiQ Pr (P |Q)> 0 P belongs to some Q
Particular-negative PoQ Pr (P |Q)< 1 The negation of P belongs to some Q
Particular-intermediate PuQ 0 < Pr (P |Q)< 1 P belongs to some but not all Q
Table 5 Composite relations between a categorical predicate P and a subject Q, described in terms of natural language
and conditional-probability constraints derived from the unconditioned-probability constraints in Table 4.
2.3 Instantiation as Linear Equalities and Inequalities
It remains to instantiate the composite relations defined in Table 4 into specific equalities and inequalities involving
the parameters x1, . . . ,x8 of the basic probability model from Section 1.3, when particular categorical terms (A, B, or
C) have been chosen as the predicate P and as the subject Q. This instantiation is accomplished by using the results of
symbolic probability inference shown in Table 3 to supply algebraic formulas for the relevant probability expressions.
For example, let us consider the UNIVERSAL-AFFIRMATIVE-EXISTENTIAL statement with predicate term A and
subject term B. As Table 5 shows, this categorical statement Aa´B says that ‘A belongs to all B, and there are some B’.
Using Table 4 and substituting A for the predicate term P and B for the subject term Q, this statement Aa´B is defined
by the probability relations Pr (B,A) = Pr (B) and Pr (B) > 0. Table 3 gives the algebraic formulas for the relevant
probability expressions. The probability Pr (B,A), meaning Pr (B = T,A = T), is given in the first row of the computed
table Pr (A,B) which appears as part (a) of Table 3: Pr (B,A)⇒ x1 + x2. The probability Pr (B), meaning Pr (B = T),
is given in the first row of the computed table Pr (B) which appears as part (e) of Table 3: Pr (B)⇒ x1 + x2 + x5 + x6.
Substituting these values into the probability relations Pr (B,A) = Pr (B) and Pr (B) > 0 derived from Table 4, the
categorical statement Aa´B is therefore defined by the following algebraic relations:
x1 + x2 = x1 + x2 + x5 + x6 (9)
x1 + x2 + x5 + x6 > 0 (10)
Equation 9 simplifies to x5+x6 = 0. Substituting this result, Equation 10 then simplifies to x1+x2 > 0. As Table 5 says,
the constraints Pr (B,A) = Pr (B) and Pr (B)> 0 that define the categorical statement Aa´B require that the conditional
probability Pr (A |B) must have the definite value 1. This is evident from inspecting Equations 9 and 10 along with the
algebraic formula computed for the conditional probability:
Pr (A = T |B = T) ⇒ (x1 + x2)/(x1 + x2 + x5 + x6) (11)
Substituting x5 + x6 = 0 from the simplified Equation 9 and using x1 + x2 > 0 from the simplified Equation 10, it
follows that this quotient expressing Pr (A |B) must have the definite value 1.
3 COMPUTING CLASSICAL AND COMPLEMENTARY SYLLOGISMS
The methods of Section 2 enable the translation of Aristotelian categorical statements into linear equalities and inequal-
ities involving the real-valued parameters x1, . . . ,x8 of the basic probability model from Section 1.3. Such equalities
and inequalities can be asserted as constraints themselves, or inferred as solutions to other systems of constraints. We
now turn to the task of performing such inference: using linear optimization to compute some linear equalities and
inequalities from others. These computed algebraic results can be used to deduce logical conclusions from Aristotelian
premises. We shall define two kinds of deductions: classical syllogisms, which follow Aristotle’s original practice;
and complementary syllogisms, which offer a useful variation on the theme. As explained further in Section 3.2, the
difference is that for classical syllogisms the minor term is held to be true, whereas for complementary syllogisms
the minor term is held to be false (in the relevant queries, which ask how the major term must be predicated upon the
minor term).
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3.1 Linear Programming to Bound Queried Probabilities
Consider an objective function f and some constraint functions g1,g2, . . . ,gm, each of which is a linear function of
a list x = (x1, . . . ,xn) of variables. Standard linear optimization methods can compute the minimum and maximum
feasible values of the objective f (x) subject to linear equality and inequality constraints such as g1(x) = 0, g2(x)> 0,
and so on [12]. Standard linear optimization methods can also detect inconsistent constraints, a potential exception
that is important to recognize.∗
For probabilistic translations of Aristotelian problems it is necessary to reason with strict inequalities (< and >)
as well as weak ones (6 and >). However common linear optimization methods treat all inequalities as weak. The
following ‘epsilon-inequality reformulation’ works around this limitation. We choose a constant value ε such as
0.01 or 1× 10−6 that is small relative to 1, and replace each strict-inequality constraint g(x) > h(x) with a weak-
inequality constraint g(x) > h(x)+ ε . The optimization problem thus reformulated is solved using standard linear
programming methods to find the minimum and maximum feasible values of the objective function f (x) subject to
the given constraints. Any computed minimum solution greater than or equal to ε is interpreted to mean that the
objective f (x) must be strictly greater than zero; likewise any computed maximum solution less than or equal to 1− ε
is interpreted to mean that the objective f (x) must be strictly less than one. Such qualitative solutions are sufficient for
Aristotelian deduction; for this application the precise value of ε is not important. Anyway most optimization solvers
use floating-point arithmetic and rely on various small constants to control their operation.
To illustrate, consider the problem defined by the premises BeA and BiC. Referring to Tables 4 and 5, the first
premise BeA says ‘B belongs to no A, or there are no A’ and translates to the probability constraint Pr (A,B) = 0 (from
which it follows that the conditional probability Pr (B |A) must have the value 0 unless it is undefined). As shown in
Table 3 (a) the probability expression Pr (A = T,B = T) has the algebraic value x1 + x2. Hence this first premise BeA
gives the linear constraint:
x1 + x2 = 0 (12)
The second premise BiC says ‘B belongs to some C’ and translates to the probability constraint Pr (B,C)> 0 (requiring
that the conditional probability Pr (B |C) > 0 as well). As Table 3 (b) shows, Pr (B = T,C = T)⇒ x1 + x5. Thus this
second premise BiC asserts the linear constraint:
x1 + x5 > 0 (13)
Applying epsilon-inequality reformulation gives the modified constraint x1 + x5 > ε . Let us choose as our objective
function the probability Pr
(
C,A
)
that C is true and A is false. As shown in Table 3 (c), this probability expression
Pr (C = T,A = F) evaluates to the algebraic formula x5 + x7.
Combining these results, appending the general constraints 0 6 xi 6 1 and ∑i xi = 1 from the basic probability
model in Section 1.3, and choosing ε = 0.01 to encode strict inequality leads to the following linear optimization
problem to find the minimum feasible value of the chosen objective probability Pr (C,A) subject to the constraints
∗It happens that following Aristotle’s restrictions on terms and premises, there are no infeasible problems. However with more than two premises,
or with terms that do not follow the typical major/minor/middle arrangement, it is quite possible to give inconsistent categorical statements. One
simple example is the premise AoA with the PARTICULAR-NEGATIVE relation type and the same term used as both subject and predicate. This
premise translates to the unsatisfiable probability constraint Pr (A,A)< Pr (A) which says that the probability that A is true is strictly less than itself.
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Objective
Probability
Algebraic
Formula
Computed
Minimum
Computed
Maximum
Pr (C,A) x1 + x3 α1 β1
Pr
(
C,A
)
x5 + x7 α2 β2
Pr
(
C,A
)
x2 + x4 α3 β3
Pr
(
C,A
)
x6 + x8 α4 β4
Table 6 Notation for minimum and maximum bounds computed on various objective functions, for the determination of
syllogism. Each bound α j or β j is the solution of a linear optimization problem.
translated from the categorical premises BeA and BiC:
Minimize : x5 + x7
subject to : x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x5 + x6 + x7 + x8 = 1
x1 + x2 = 0
x1 + x5 > ε
and : ε = 0.01
06 x1 6 1
06 x2 6 1
06 x3 6 1
06 x4 6 1
06 x5 6 1
06 x6 6 1
06 x7 6 1
06 x8 6 1
(14)
Linear optimization yields the numerical solution 0.01. This computed minimum value says directly that the given
constraints require x5 + x7 > 0.01. Reversing epsilon-inequality encoding, we interpret this numerical solution as the
strict algebraic inequality x5 + x7 > 0 which says that the value of the objective function is constrained to be greater
than zero at all feasible points. The complementary problem to find the maximum value of the same objective subject
to the same constraints yields the solution exactly 1. In other words the given constraints require x5 + x7 6 1 (which
we already knew from the general constraints included in the basic probability model).
3.2 Criteria for Classical and Complementary Syllogism
All four Aristotelian figures use the same query, in which the major term A is the predicate and the minor term C is the
subject. The meaning of this common query AsC, which is shown in Table 1, is as follows. We seek every relation type
s from the set {a, a´,e, e´, i,o,u} of composite types from Table 4 for which the categorical statement AsC is a necessary
consequence of the two categorical statements which have been asserted as premises. There may be zero, one, or many
such satisfactory relation types s. If there is at least one satisfactory relation type, we say that a ‘syllogism’ (deduction)
is present; but if there are no satisfactory relation types then there is no syllogism. Let us say that a ‘classical’ syllogism
concerns a deduced statement in which the minor term C is held to be true. We shall also consider ‘complementary’
syllogisms in which the minor term C is held to be false. Hence to find a complementary syllogism, the query uses
the form AsC whose subject is the negation of the minor term. It is possible to have complementary syllogism with or
without classical syllogism (and likewise to have classical syllogism with or without complementary syllogism).
The results of certain probability-optimization problems indicate precisely which relation types are necessary
consequences of the premises provided. To wit, there are four objective functions whose minimum and maximum
feasible values must be computed, subject to the constraints translated from the provided premises (and subject also
to the general constraints in the basic probability model that reflect the laws of probability). These four objective
functions are the joint probabilities of the various combinations of truth and falsity of the extreme terms A and C:
Pr (C,A) Pr
(
C,A
)
Pr
(
C,A
)
Pr
(
C,A
)
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Computed Bounds Categorical
Pr (C,A) Pr
(
C,A
)
Inferred Probability Relations Deduction
β2 = 0 Pr (C,A) = Pr (C) AaC
α1 > 0 β2 = 0 Pr (C,A) = Pr (C) and Pr (C)> 0 Aa´C
β1 = 0 Pr (C,A) = 0 AeC
β1 = 0 α2 > 0 Pr (C,A) = 0 and Pr (C)> 0 Ae´C
α1 > 0 Pr (C,A)> 0 AiC
α2 > 0 Pr (C,A)< Pr (C) AoC
α1 > 0 α2 > 0 Pr (C,A)> 0 and Pr (C,A)< Pr (C) AuC
Table 7 Criteria for classical syllogism, describing how the major term A must be predicated upon the minor term C
when C is true, using the given premises as constraints. Here α1 is the minimum and β1 the maximum feasible value of
Pr (C,A); likewise α2 is the minimum and β2 the maximum feasible value of Pr
(
C,A
)
. Multiple criteria may apply.
Computed Bounds Categorical
Pr
(
C,A
)
Pr
(
C,A
)
Inferred Probability Relations Deduction
β4 = 0 Pr (C,A)= Pr (C) AaC
α3 > 0 β4 = 0 Pr (C,A)= Pr (C) and Pr (C)> 0 Aa´C
β3 = 0 Pr (C,A)= 0 AeC
β3 = 0 α4 > 0 Pr (C,A)= 0 and Pr (C)> 0 Ae´C
α3 > 0 Pr
(
C,A
)
> 0 AiC
α4 > 0 Pr
(
C,A
)
< Pr
(
C
)
AoC
α3 > 0 α4 > 0 Pr
(
C,A
)
> 0 and Pr
(
C,A
)
< Pr
(
C
)
AuC
Table 8 Criteria for complementary syllogism, describing how the major term A must be predicated upon the minor term
C when C is false, using the given premises as constraints. Here α3 is the minimum and β3 the maximum feasible value of
Pr
(
C,A
)
; likewise α4 is the minimum and β4 the maximum feasible value of Pr (C,A). Multiple criteria may apply.
As shown in Table 6, the symbols α j and β j are used to represent the computed minimum and maximum values for
these four objectives. Table 3 part (c) gives the algebraic forms of the relevant probability expressions, which are also
included in Table 6. These algebraic formulas are used as objective functions during the formulation of optimization
problems. Because these objectives represent probabilities, each pair of computed minimum and maximum values
is already constrained by 0 6 α j 6 β j 6 1. Therefore it would be trivial to compute a minimum value α j = 0 or a
maximum value β j = 1 for any queried probability, as the laws of probability already require these bounds. A proper
deduction requires the computation of a nontrivial upper or lower bound on at least one of the queried probabilities.
The numerical solutions computed depend on the value ε chosen to encode strict inequality (following the epsilon-
inequality encoding scheme discussed in Section 3.1), although subsequent interpretation does not depend on the
precise value of ε .
The computed minimum and maximum values α j and β j defined in Table 6 determine the presence or absence of
syllogism, according to the rules discussed presently. Table 7 shows the criteria for classical syllogism, describing the
necessary relationships between the major term A as predicate and the (affirmative) minor term C as subject. Table 8
shows the criteria for complementary syllogism, describing the necessary relationships between the major term A as
predicate and the negation C of the minor term as subject. As may be evident already, the criteria presented in Tables 7
and 8 for deducing categorical relationships based on relations involving probabilities are none other than the criteria
presented in Table 4 for defining categorical relationships based on relations involving probabilities, instantiated for
the predicate term A and the subject term C (or its negation C).
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To illustrate, let us consider how the computed optimization result α2 > 0 gives the categorical deduction AoC, as
shown in the penultimate row of Table 7. As shown in Table 6, the symbol α2 designates the minimum feasible value
of the probability Pr
(
C,A
)
subject to the provided constraints. A computed solution α2 which is strictly greater than
zero means that the constraints require Pr
(
C,A
)
> 0. The laws of probability provide that:
Pr (C) = Pr (C,A)+Pr
(
C,A
) (15)
As all probabilities are nonnegative, the inequality Pr
(
C,A
)
> 0 joined with Equation 15 requires in turn that Pr (C,A)<
Pr (C). Returning to Table 4, this derived inequality Pr (C,A)< Pr (C) is precisely the definition of the PARTICULAR-
NEGATIVE categorical relationship with predicate A and subject C, abbreviated AoC. Also, as Table 5 shows, this
unconditioned-probability inequality Pr (C,A)< Pr (C) implies the conditional-probability inequality Pr (A |C)< 1.
Applying this criterion to the example problem from Section 3.1 produces the deduction that AoC is a necessary
consequence of the premises BeA and BiC. The solutions calculated for the example in Section 3.1 are the bounds
α2 = 0.01 and β2 = 1 on the objective x5+x7 (translated from the probability expression Pr (C,A)) when this objective
is subjected to the constraints x1 + x2 = 0 and x1 + x5 > 0 (translated from the categorical premises BeA and BiC) and
the constraints 0 6 xi 6 1 and ∑i xi = 1 (from the basic probability model). The computed solution α2 = 0.01 says
directly that the given constraints require that the objective Pr (C,A)> 0.01 at all feasible points. Following the chain
of reasoning outlined above, we interpret this numerical solution to mean the strict inequality Pr
(
C,A
)
> 0 and in
turn Pr (C,A) < Pr (C). This last inequality is the definition of the categorical relationship AoC (from Table 4). Thus
is it derived using probability and optimization that the premises BeA and BiC require the conclusion AoC. In other
words, the premises ‘B belongs to no A, or there are no A’ and ‘B belongs to some C’ require the conclusion that ‘The
negation of A belongs to some C’ (which might alternatively be stated as ‘A does not belong to some C’).
Following convention we abbreviate each classical syllogism as mns-k where m is the code of the major premise’s
relation type, n is the code for the minor premise, s is the code for the deduced relation type, and k is the number of
the problem’s figure. Hence ‘aaa-1’, ‘eio-2’, and so on. By analogy each complementary syllogism is abbreviated
as mns-k, using the bar over the figure number to indicate the negation of the minor term in the deduced statement.
Syllogistic deductions can also be displayed in alternative notation using the turnstile symbol or a tabular arrangement
of formulas, as in:
BeA,BiC ⊢ AoC (16)
or:
BeA
BiC
∴ AoC
(17)
for the pattern eio-2.
4 EXHAUSTIVE ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTELIAN PROBLEMS
Using the probability and optimization methods presented above, let us now analyze all possible Aristotelian problems
with the structure given in Section 1.1 and the types of categorical relationships enumerated in Table 4. For this task
we shall consider all 4 figures, and within each figure all 7 possible relationship types for each of the 2 premises.
This gives 4× 72 or 196 distinct Aristotelian problems. For each Aristotelian problem we set up 8 optimization
problems: one problem to find the minimum feasible value α j and one to find the maximum feasible value β j of each
of the 4 objective probabilities from Table 6. This gives 8 optimization problems for each of the 196 Aristotelian
problems, hence 1,568 optimization problems altogether. For each Aristotelian problem, we compare the results
of its 8 optimization problems with the deductive criteria listed in Tables 7 and 8 for classical and complementary
syllogism. Using each table of deductive criteria, we record a yes/no answer for whether the optimization results
satisfy the requirements for each of the 7 types of categorical relationships; thus there are 14 yes/no answers for each
of the 196 Aristotelian problems.
The results of this exhaustive analysis are displayed in Tables 9 through 12, in the following format. Each result
table has two parts: part (a) which shows classical syllogisms, and part (b) which shows complementary syllogisms.
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Minor premise (BnC)
Major
premise
(AmB)
a a´ e e´ i o u
a a a´, a, i i i
a´ a a´, a, i i i
e e e´, e, o o o
e´ e e´, e, o o o
i
o
u
Minor premise (BnC)
Major
premise
(AmB)
a a´ e e´ i o u
a
a´ i i
e
e´ o o
i i i
o o o
u u u
(a) Classical syllogism (AsC) (b) Complementary syllogism (AsC)
Table 9 Analysis of Aristotelian problems in the First Figure. Tabulated is every type s for which the categorical
statement AsC (classical) or AsC (complementary) is a valid deduction from the indexing premises AmB and BnC.
Within each part there is a 7× 7 inner table. Each row of an inner table indicates the type of the major premise; each
column indicates the type of the minor premise. Tabulated within each cell of an inner table are the codes for all of the
valid deductions from the premises indexed by that row and column, using the figure indicated. These valid deductions
are syllogisms.
For concreteness let us focus on Table 9 part (a) which describes the classical syllogisms in Aristotle’s first figure,
whose major premise AmB and minor premise BnC have types m and n. Focusing more specifically on one particular
problem in the first figure, the third row (labeled ‘e’) indicates the major premise AeB, the first column (labeled ‘a’)
indicates the minor premise BaC. The solitary cell entry ‘e’ at this row and column says that the only valid deduction
from these premises is AeC. That is, from the premises ‘A belongs to no B, or there are no B’ and ‘B belongs to all C,
or there are no C,’ there follows the conclusion ‘A belongs to no C, or there are no C.’ This syllogistic pattern ‘eae-1’ is
also known by the medieval name ‘Celarent’. (The vowels in the medieval names give codes for categorical relations
in the same sequence as the mns-k abbreviation. The consonants in the medieval names also convey information,
which is not essential to the analysis presented here.)
Remaining in the third row but moving over to the second column (labeled ‘a´’) gives slightly different result. Here
there are three cell entries e´, e, and o. These indicate that all three statements Ae´C, AeC, and AoC are valid deductions
from the premises AeB and Ba´C. That is, from the premises ‘A belongs to no B, or there are no B’ and ‘B belongs to
all C, and there are some C,’ there follow three necessary conclusions:
Ae´C: ‘A belongs to no C, and there are some C’
AeC: ‘Either A belongs to no C, or there are no C’
AoC: ‘The negation of A belongs to some C’
Let us abbreviate these patterns of deduction as ‘ea´e´-1’, ‘ea´e-1’, and ‘ea´o-1’, with the accent marks used as in Table 4
to distinguish EXISTENTIAL from MATERIAL statements. By analogy with the medieval names we could call these
patterns of syllogism ‘Cela´re´nt’, ‘Cela´rent’ and ‘Cela´ront’. Note that there is no syllogism ‘eao-1’ listed in Table 9 (a);
the pattern named ‘Celaront’ would be a mistake. In interpreting these results it is important to pay attention to what
is absent as well as to what is present.
4.1 Classical Modes of Syllogism Reproduced
The results of probability-optimization analysis shown in Tables 9 through 12 reproduce the standard modes of Aris-
totelian syllogism, which are described for example in [2] and [11]. Let us focus for a moment on the four relation
types {a,e, i,o}, excluding the PARTICULAR-INTERMEDIATE relation u and also excluding the EXISTENTIAL subtypes
a´ and e´ of the UNIVERSAL-AFFIRMATIVE and UNIVERSAL-NEGATIVE relations. Table 9 (a) indicates the following
four patterns of syllogism for Aristotle’s first figure (displayed here with their medieval names):
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Minor premise (BnC)
Major
premise
(BmA)
a a´ e e´ i o u
a e e´, e, o o o
a´ e e´, e, o o o
e e e´, e, o o o
e´ e e´, e, o o o
i
o
u
Minor premise (BnC)
Major
premise
(BmA)
a a´ e e´ i o u
a
a´ i i
e
e´ i i
i i i
o i i
u i i i i
(a) Classical syllogism (AsC) (b) Complementary syllogism (AsC)
Table 10 Analysis of Aristotelian problems in the Second Figure. Tabulated is every type s for which the categorical
statement AsC (classical) or AsC (complementary) is a valid deduction from the indexing premises BmA and BnC.
Minor premise (CnB)
Major
premise
(AmB)
a a´ e e´ i o u
a i i i
a´ i i i i
e o o o
e´ o o o o
i i i
o o o
u u u
Minor premise (CnB)
Major
premise
(AmB)
a a´ e e´ i o u
a i i i
a´ i i i i
e o o o
e´ o o o o
i i i
o o o
u u u
(a) Classical syllogism (AsC) (b) Complementary syllogism (AsC)
Table 11 Analysis of Aristotelian problems in the Third Figure. Tabulated is every type s for which the categorical
statement AsC (classical) or AsC (complementary) is a valid deduction from the indexing premises AmB and CnB.
Minor premise (CnB)
Major
premise
(BmA)
a a´ e e´ i o u
a e e
a´ i i e e
e o o o
e´ o o o
i i i
o
u i i
Minor premise (CnB)
Major
premise
(BmA)
a a´ e e´ i o u
a e e
a´ e e i i
e o o o
e´ o o o
i i i
o
u i i
(a) Classical syllogism (AsC) (b) Complementary syllogism (AsC)
Table 12 Analysis of Aristotelian problems in the Fourth Figure. Tabulated is every type s for which the categorical
statement AsC (classical) or AsC (complementary) is a valid deduction from the indexing premises BmA and CnB.
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aaa-1 (Barbara) aii-1 (Darii) eae-1 (Celarent) eio-1 (Ferio)
Remember, for each syllogism denoted mns-k, the type m of the major premise gives the row, the type n of the minor
premise gives the column, and the type s of the deduced statement appears in the cell at that row and column in the
specified results table; k is the number of the figure. Table 10 (a) shows the following four modes of syllogism for the
second figure:
aee-2 (Camestres) aoo-2 (Baroco) eae-2 (Cesare) eio-2 (Festino)
Table 11 (a) shows the following four modes of syllogism for the third figure:
aii-3 (Datisi) eio-3 (Ferison) iai-3 (Disamis) oao-3 (Bocardo)
Table 12 (a) shows the following three modes of syllogism for the fourth figure:
aee-4 (Camenes) eio-4 (Fresison) iai-4 (Dimaris)
There are few notable absences from the modes of syllogism listed here: aai-3 (Darapti); eao-3 (Felapton); aai-4
(Bramantip); and eao-4 (Fesapo). These cases are addressed in the next section.
4.2 Existential Fallacies Revealed
Discipline about the different subtypes of universal statements prevents existential fallacies from contaminating our
analysis of Aristotelian problems. For example, Table 11 (a) shows that there are no valid syllogisms ‘aai-3’ nor ‘eao-
3’. In other words the patterns ‘Darapti’ and ‘Felapton’ are invalid using the MATERIAL interpretation of their UNI-
VERSAL premises. However the patterns ‘Da´rapti’, ‘Dara´pti’, and ‘Da´ra´pti’ are all valid, as are ‘Fe´lapton’, ‘Fela´pton’,
and ‘Fe´la´pton’. Valid syllogism in these cases requires that the truth of the middle term B is not impossible a priori,
in other words the existence of B (in the third figure, the middle term B is the subject of both premises).
Likewise, Table 12 (a) shows that there are no valid syllogisms ‘aai-4’ nor ‘eao-4’. In other words the patterns
‘Bramantip’ and ‘Fesapo’ are invalid using the MATERIAL interpretation of their UNIVERSAL premises. However
the following patterns are valid: ‘Bra´mantip’, ‘Bra´ma´ntip’, ‘Fesa´po’, and ‘Fe´sa´po’. For the ‘Bramantip’ patterns,
syllogism requires that the truth of the major term A is not impossible a priori (that is, they require the existence of A,
which is the predicate of the major premise). For the ‘Fesapo’ patterns, syllogism requires that the truth of the middle
term B is not impossible a priori (that is, they require the existence of B, which is the predicate of the minor premise).
4.3 Complementary Syllogisms Added
As an additional benefit, analysis according to the probability-optimization paradigm finds instances of complementary
syllogism which were not heretofore appreciated. Complementary syllogisms can recover information contained
within the premises that would otherwise be lost. For example, consider the problem in the first figure with premises
AiB and BeC. There is no classical syllogism in this case: no particular relation is required when A is predicated on
C. However there is a complementary syllogism in which the negation of the minor term C is used as the subject of
the query. As Table 9 (b) shows, the deduction AiC is a necessary consequence of the premises AiB and BeC. That
is, there follows from the premises ‘A belongs to some B’ and ‘B belongs to no C, or there are no C’ the necessary
consequence that ‘A belongs to some non-C’. This instance of complementary syllogism is abbreviated ‘iei-¯1’ (note
the bar over the figure number; there is no valid classical syllogism iei-1). As it happens, all four patterns iei-¯1, iei-¯2,
iei-¯3, and iei-¯4 represent valid deductions:
AiB,BeC ⊢ AiC (18)
BiA,BeC ⊢ AiC (19)
AiB,CeB ⊢ AiC (20)
BiA,CeB ⊢ AiC (21)
Despite their different figures, each pair of premises here shares the identical (and solitary) consequence that ‘A
belongs to some non-C’.
14
5 CONCLUSION
Using probability and optimization, it is possible to compute solutions to the logic problems that Aristotle described
in Prior Analytics. The requisite calculations take advantage of two kinds of mappings: first between categorical
statements and relations involving probabilities; and second between probability expressions and algebraic expressions
(linear functions and fractional linear functions). These mappings allow categorical statements to be translated to
and from linear equalities and inequalities involving a few real-valued variables. To begin the analysis, Aristotelian
premises are translated into systems of linear constraints. Numerical bounds are then computed on the feasible values
of certain objective functions, subject to these constraints. These computed bounds reveal precisely which categorical
statements are necessary consequences of the premises that were asserted. Every valid syllogism from an Aristotelian
problem can be computed in this way.
There are several benefits to this probability-optimization formulation of Aristotle’s logic. First, the inference uses
quite ordinary mathematical methods: symbolic probability inference (which is essentially arithmetic with polynomial
expressions) and linear programming. It is straightforward to write computer programs to automate these calculations
(as the author has done to generate the result which are reported above). Second, the results of probability-optimization
analysis not only reproduce the known modes of Aristotelian syllogism; they also add new deductive results. The
analysis clarifies the role of existential import in certain patterns of syllogism (such as the incorrect modes aai-3, eao-
3, aai-4, and eao-4). The analysis adds new appreciation for ‘complementary’ syllogisms: deduced consequences in
which the subject is held to be false instead of true. For example, it happens that there is no valid classical syllogism
from a PARTICULAR-AFFIRMATIVE major premise (code i) and a UNIVERSAL-NEGATIVE minor premise (whether
MATERIAL or EXISTENTIAL, code e or e´) in any figure. But in every figure this combination of premise types leads to
a valid complementary syllogism: the major term A must have the PARTICULAR-AFFIRMATIVE relation to the negation
C of the minor term (the shared deduction AiC says that ‘A belongs to some non-C’).
There are many ways to extend this computational framework to provide even more capabilities. In addition
to computing the categorical relationships that are necessary consequences of the given premises, it is possible to
compute the relationships that are merely potential consequences of the given premises, as well as those relationships
that are inconsistent with the premises (using criteria modified from those given in Tables 7 and 8). Thus alethic
modalities of truth can be inferred by numerical computation. Furthermore, it is possible to use any numbers of terms
and premises, with the terms distributed among the premises and query in an arbitrary fashion. It is not necessary
to stick to Aristotle’s original restrictions of using two premises with a common middle term that is not included in
the query. Finally, it is possible to use probability models other than the basic one introduced here. As discussed
further in [19], different probability models (with the full-joint probability distribution over categorical terms factored
into several input tables) allow the use of other semantic types of conditional statements (such as subjunctives), at the
expense of introducing nonlinearity into the polynomials used.
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A SOURCE CODE
The probability and optimization results displayed above were generated by the author’s preprocessor pqlpp in re-
sponse to commands embedded as comments in a specially prepared LATEX source file. The preprocessor replaced
the commands with their output, and the resulting file was processed by the usual LATEX tools to make the document
that you see now. The source code for the probability model, and instructions for performing the exhaustive analysis
reported in Section 4, are presented in this appendix. The results of exhaustive analysis were generated as a CSV
(comma-separated value) text file (viewable as a spreadsheet), whose contents the author manually copied into the
tables in Section 4.
A.1 Probability Model: aristotle.pql
This is the specification of the parametric probability network used for analysis, in the format used by the author’s
pqlsh and pqlpp programs.
// aristotle.pql: setup for Aristotle’s syllogism, just add constraints
parameter e {
tex = "\epsilon";
label = "Strict inequality";
range = 0.01;
}
primary A { label = "Major term"; states = binary; }
primary B { label = "Middle term"; states = binary; }
primary C { label = "Minor term"; states = binary; }
clique _C; potential ( _C : A B C ) { parametric(x); }
A.2 Script for Exhaustive Analysis: syllogism.tcl
This is the TCL script for performing exhaustive analysis, using the author’s pqlsh program.
# Analyze all possible Aristotlean syllogism problems, as linear programs
proc premise_constraint { model tbl type epsilon } {
# e.g. AaB means Pr(B=T,A=F)==0 hence Pr(A|B)==1
# input $tbl has Pr(B,A) for premise AmB; first 2 items have B=T
# type ‘aa’ is universal affirmative with existential import
# AaaB means Pr(B=T,A=F)==0 && Pr(B=T,A=T)>0, hence Pr(A|B)==1 && Pr(B)>0
# type ‘ee’ is universal negative with existential import
# AeeB means Pr(B=T,A=T)==0 && Pr(B=T,A=F)>0, hence Pr(A|B)==0 && Pr(B)>0
switch $type {
a { $model add_constraint "[$tbl item 2] == 0" }
aa { $model add_constraint "[$tbl item 2] == 0";
$model add_constraint "[$tbl item 1] >= $epsilon" }
e { $model add_constraint "[$tbl item 1] == 0" }
ee { $model add_constraint "[$tbl item 1] == 0";
$model add_constraint "[$tbl item 2] >= $epsilon" }
i { $model add_constraint "[$tbl item 1] >= $epsilon" }
o { $model add_constraint "[$tbl item 2] >= $epsilon" }
u { $model add_constraint "[$tbl item 1] >= $epsilon";
$model add_constraint "[$tbl item 2] >= $epsilon" }
default { puts "premise_constraint: unknown type $type ignored" }
}
}
proc conclusions { uval tbl_lb tbl_ub } {
upvar $uval val
17
foreach n {1 2 3 4} {
set alpha($n) [$tbl_lb item $n]; set beta($n) [$tbl_ub item $n]
}
# first test for classical syllogism
set val(a) [expr $beta(2) == 0]
set val(e) [expr $beta(1) == 0]
set val(i) [expr $alpha(1) > 0]
set val(o) [expr $alpha(2) > 0]
set val(u) [expr $alpha(1) > 0 && $alpha(2) > 0]
# ...with direct existential import for universals
set val(aa) [expr $beta(2) == 0 && $alpha(1) > 0]
set val(ee) [expr $beta(1) == 0 && $alpha(2) > 0]
# next test for complementary syllogism
set val(ac) [expr $beta(4) == 0]
set val(ec) [expr $beta(3) == 0]
set val(ic) [expr $alpha(3) > 0]
set val(oc) [expr $alpha(4) > 0]
set val(uc) [expr $alpha(3) > 0 && $alpha(4) > 0]
# ...with direct existential import for universals
set val(aac) [expr $beta(4) == 0 && $alpha(3) > 0]
set val(eec) [expr $beta(3) == 0 && $alpha(4) > 0]
# build a summary string
set res ""
foreach t {aa ee a e u i o} { if $val($t) {lappend res $t} }
foreach t {aac eec ac ec uc ic oc} { if $val($t) {lappend res $t} }
return $res
}
proc syllogism { model {A "A"} {B "B"} {C "C"} {epsilon "e"} {sep ","} } {
set fig1 [dict create major "$A $B" minor "$B $C"]
set fig2 [dict create major "$B $A" minor "$B $C"]
set fig3 [dict create major "$A $B" minor "$C $B"]
set fig4 [dict create major "$B $A" minor "$C $B"]
set figures [dict create 1 $fig1 2 $fig2 3 $fig3 4 $fig4]
# adjust this as needed e.g. to ignore aa, ee, u
set types {a aa e ee i o u}
set tbl_query [[$model table $C $A] infer]; # for bounds on Pr(A|C)
puts [join "id figure pmajor pminor conseq" $sep]
dict for {fig terms} $figures {
# predicates and subjects of major and minor premises
set major_pred [lindex [dict get $terms major] 0]
set major_subj [lindex [dict get $terms major] 1]
set minor_pred [lindex [dict get $terms minor] 0]
set minor_subj [lindex [dict get $terms minor] 1]
# joint prob tables: e.g. for AeB, regarding Pr(A|B), infer Pr(B,A)
set tbl_major [[$model table $major_subj $major_pred] infer]
set tbl_minor [[$model table $minor_subj $minor_pred] infer]
set n 0
foreach major_type $types {
foreach minor_type $types {
incr n; set id [format "%.2f" [expr $fig + $n/100.0]];
# formluate and solve optimization problems
$model clear_constraints
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premise_constraint $model $tbl_major $major_type $epsilon
premise_constraint $model $tbl_minor $minor_type $epsilon
$model ppinit
set tbl_lb [$tbl_query lower_bound]
set tbl_ub [$tbl_query upper_bound]
set tqb [$tbl_query bound]
# determine conclusions
array set cq {}
set cqsum [conclusions cq $tbl_lb $tbl_ub]
# print results to standard output
puts -nonewline [join "$id $fig $major_type $minor_type" $sep]
puts "$sep$cqsum"
# print details to standard error
puts -nonewline stderr "\n\nARISTOTLE $id: ";
puts -nonewline stderr "$major_pred $major_type $major_subj, ";
puts stderr "$minor_pred $minor_type $minor_subj, ";
puts stderr [$model constraints]
puts stderr [$tqb print]
}
}
}
}
set m [pql::load aristotle.pql]
pql::print_format text
syllogism $m A B C e ","
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